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1. Introduction
The problem of Justice and Taxation, is an interesting theme because it is not only an economic 
question which invested a lot of the best intelligence in the history from Smith to Hayek, but also an 
argument which is crucial for many different economic categories: firms, Individuals, and investors 
who very often consider alternative scenarios including the fiscal option. 
In  general  the  progressive  taxation is  considered  morally  correct  and  for  this  reason  it  is 
recognized by the major economies as the best solution for the distribution of income.   
The objective of taxation is to provide resources for financing public services which are useful for 
the collectivity but not marketable. 
Which kind of public services include, depend on the role of the state or in philosophical terms on 
the contents of the social contract.  
In strict terms, some of the tasks of the state are the following: 
• assuring its defense (which is strictly linked with the sovereignty of the state inside and 
outside).
• The administration of justice.
Public schooling, the health system, and many others services related to the welfare state may be 
included in the tasks of the state or alternatively satisfied by the market. It is evident that if the state 
includes more tasks, the costs proportionally increase and  the amount of internal revenues must 
consequently increase in absolute terms. 
Returning to the fiscal system our interrogative is:
What are the principles of functioning of flat taxation, compared to progressive taxation ?  
2. Definition and characteristics
In order to simplify the task we consider only income taxation which is part of the indirect taxation, 
in our argumentation; however many arguments are applicable to systems with similar mechanisms. 
The key characteristic of flat taxation is that the rate applied to the gross salary, remains the same 
without considering the total income. If, for example, the government with the Fiscal Ministers or 
the fiscal agency fixes the taxation rate at 30%, this percentage is applied to all the incomes which 
are included in the taxation area. This kind of taxation was adopted initially in Estonia in 1994, in 
Lithuania in 1994 and then in Latvia in 1995 and Russia 2001. Today the great part of Eastern 
European Countries adopted the flat tax1. 
The following table provides a view of the countries which adopted this fiscal system:
Country Year of 
Adoption 
Current Personal 
income Tax Rate(s)
Estonia 1994 21%
Lithuania 1994 15%
Latvia 1995 26%
Russia 2001 13%
Serbia 2003 12%
Slovakia 2004 19%
Ukraine 2004 15%
Georgia 2005 20%
Romania 2005 16%
Sources: www.taxrates.cc.
As showed in this list the major Eastern European Countries starting from the 90s adopted the flat 
tax, with only one or in some cases two percentage.   
On the contrary,  the progressive taxation is founded on the principle that  the tax percentage is 
variable  and increases  with the  increase of  the  income.  For  example in  my country,  Italy,  the 
progressive taxation is configured  based on the following system:
Gross annual income Tax Rate Gross amount of taxation
From 0 to 15,000 23% 23% of the Gross Annual Income
From 15,000.01 to 28,000 27% 3,450+27% on the part exceeding  15,000 
From 28,000.01 to 55,000 38% 6,960+38% on the part exceeding  28,000
From 55,000.01 to 75,000 41% 17,220+41% on the part exceeding 55,000
Over 75,000 43% 25,420+43%  on the part exceeding 75,000
Sources: www.agenziaentrate.gov.it.
*The monetary data filled in the first and third column are expressed in Euro
 
Following this configuration, the amount of taxation is calculated considering different percentage 
of tax rate. 
For example, if  the Gross Annual Income is:  60,000 €, using the aforementioned rule the gross 
amount of taxation becomes: 
17,220+ (60,000-55,000.01)*41% = 19,270 €
1 Cfr.: R. Murphy - A Flat Tax for the UK? the Implications of Simplification – An ACCA Discussion Paper, June 
2006. pp. 20-24.
So the percentage of taxation, compared to the Gross Annual Income, becomes:
19,270 / 60,000 = 32%
Now, hypothesizing a gross annual income of 90,000 €, the gross amount of taxation become:
25,240+ (90,000-75,000)*43% = 31,870 €
31,870 / 90,000 = 35%  
Starting from the same amount of taxation the corresponding flat tax rate, is:
(19,270+31,870) / (60,000+90,000) = 34% 
Therefore to  obtain the same amount of  internal  revenue the government  has  to apply the 
percentage calculated above.
From this simple calculation it is possible to deduce the following assertion:
Different kinds of taxation (progressive or flat) can produce the same internal revenue.
This is an important result because the flat tax rate can guarantee the same internal revenue for 
the government, significant differences are focused about other aspects. 
Following our investigation other questions will be explored. In particular: 
is progressive taxation more efficient for the government?
Is  progressive taxation more equal? Or in other terms does it reflect the ethical principles more 
adequately?  
This aspects are examined in the following paragraphs which illustrate the advantages of flat tax 
system. 
3.  The advantages 
In order to introduce the advantages of flat taxation in comparative terms it is necessary from my 
point of view to examine the objectives of the two parties: the government and the taxpayer. 
Imaging that  each  party  is  represented  by  two different  objective  functions,  the  equilibrium is 
localized in the intersection of the graphic which represents the two functions. Therefore following 
this assumption it is necessary to analysis the objectives and find a possible coincidence of interests.
The  objective  function  or interests  of  the  government are  to  obtain  the  internal  revenue 
predicted. Naturally, it is necessary to predict a legal sanctions system, and an efficient monitoring 
system for the tax evader.  A deficit  in the internal revenue is  problematic  for the government, 
because  it  obliges  the  government  to  increase  taxation  in  its  different  forms  or  reduce  public 
spending.  
The interest of the taxpayer  is clearly to pay as little as possible, because taxation reduces the 
income available for personal choice, but at the same time, to receive good public services. To this 
end  it  is  useful  to  remember  that  more  public  spending  is  not  synonymous  with  better  public 
services. 
Where is the interests meets ?
This question is widely treated in the literature, which is known as  “Laffer Curve”. This theory, 
although attributed but not invented by the US economist Arthur B. Laffer2, illustrates the trade-off 
between tax rates and tax revenues. The curve shows that governments can maximize tax revenue 
by adopting a tax rate at the peak point of the curve and that raising tax rates thereafter reduces tax 
revenues. The logic is that the disincentive effect of tax paid does, above a certain tax rate, reduce 
effort expended by the taxpayer. 
It suggests that the optimal tax rate (T%) is at the peak of the curve, and it will be noted that a 
fixed level of taxation revenue can, according to this idea, be raised with two taxation rates at all 
levels except the optimal rate. It must be stressed that there is no reason why the curve is evenly 
shaped as shown. T% could be anywhere between 1% and 99%.
Our scope is to show that it is possible obtain an optimal tax rate, without renouncing fairness.
In  general  the  quality  of  public  services  (for  example:  justice,  police,  defense)  is  not  strictly 
correlated with the resources attributed to them. An increasing number of resources available for 
public services not accompanied by a clear strategy do not produce benefits; therefore it  is not 
correct to adopt as index of efficiency of public services, the resources attributed to it. On the 
contrary an amount  of  resources  directed  to  the  internal  revenue is  a  significant  part  of 
capital which is subtracted from the possibility of alternative uses which increase economic 
activity.
For these reasons the problem of optimal taxation is a question which invests the micro and macro 
category. Following these considerations one starting question is: 
How much time is dedicated to absolve the fiscal obligation by the taxpayer ?
It is evident that the progressive tax system needs more sophisticated calculation, which must be 
done by the taxpayer.
For the U.S. one good measure of tax complexity may be the number of sub-chapters in the Internal 
Revenue Code. Between 1954 and 1994 the number of sub-chapters increased from 103 to 698. A 
flat tax would eliminate much of this complexity3.
Moreover, it is evident that with a easier taxation system such as the flat tax suggest,  it is not 
necessaries  the  support  and  the  management  of  a  chartered  accountant  or  equivalent,  which 
represent an advantage  in terms of time and costs for the taxpayer. 
The  simplification  implies  other  advantages;  the  possibility  of  calculating  the  tax  due  is  an 
important element in an economic system, because the exact knowledge of the amount tax due, 
reduces the uncertainty respect to the decisions of the economic operators mainly taxpayers. On the 
contrary, the unclear calculability of the  tax due to increase in the state of uncertainty which is 
transfered in the entire system through prices, incomes, and profits. In fact, as a result of: 
Net Income = Gross Income – Taxes 
Net Profit = Gross Profit - Taxes
But when the amount tax due is not known at first sight, there are evident consequences. In the 
long term, this phenomenon generates an recessive effect because disincentive the investments, in 
particular the direct investment which are not attracted from aleatory scenarios. 
The advantages of a simplified system are extended to another important issue related with the tax 
question.  Hypothesizing  the  same  amount  of  tax due in  two  different  taxation  systems  (flat, 
progressive) following the example above illustrated, we have: 
2 Cfr.: A. B. Laffer - The Laffer Curve, Past, Present and Future. Retrieved from the Heritage Foundation -  June 1, 
2004. No. 1765. pp. 1-18. 
3 Cfr.: Institute Brief, Vol. 3, No. 7, July 1996. pp. 1-2.
• flat taxation system,             - 19270 €
• progressive taxation system, - 19270 €
Starting from the parity of gross amount the first amount reported (which is the result of flat tax) 
is  clearly  preferable,  because  it  is  easier  to  calculate,  which  means  that  the  correctness  of  the 
declaration is more verifiable from the government. So, the key question become:
How many resources are spent by the government and (in ultimate instance from the taxpayer) for 
monitoring the correctness of the declaration? 
It is all evidence that the monitoring activity of the flat taxation system is clearly less expensive, 
respect to a progressive system, so coming back to the aforementioned amounts the first amount 
absorbs a cost of  monitoring approximately 1% whereas the second amount absorbs 5% of the 
same amount. 
For these reasons, I think that the only category which can obtain advantages from the complexity 
of the taxation system is the category of tax evaders. 
This  introduces another important  issue related to  the organization of the taxation system.  Tax 
evasion is a complex phenomenon which invests not only economic aspects. However, it is clear 
that the decision to evade depends rationally on three factors summarized in the following equation:
T =  P * S
T - The amount of the taxes evaded.  
P - The probability to be discovered from the fiscal agency.
S - The sanctions due to the government by the tax evader discovered.
In order to reduce the phenomenon of evasion, which produces many problems for the individuals 
and the economy, it is necessary to manage the variables to this end.
Naturally  every  single  variable  needs  a  treatment,  although  our  scope  is  not  to  deal  with  tax 
evasion; there are many issues relative to tax evasion which are related to the different taxation 
systems4. 
Leaving apart the  first, and the third  variables, of the equation which need of a deeper analysis 
comprising national peculiarities, and other aspects often subjected more to political, than economic 
considerations; the second variable (i.e. the probability of being discovered which is the correlated 
with the complexity of the taxation system) is increasable simply by reducing the complexity of the 
taxation system; this is an operation which can seriously support  the battle against tax evasion. 
The simplification can produce advantages for all the different economic operators.
Another advantage of flat taxation compared to progressive taxation is related with the absence of 
fiscal drag. Fiscal drag is an increasing of the fiscal pressure originating from progressive taxation 
and an increase of nominal income. This  phenomenon is  particularly evident  in an inflationary 
context. During the 70s and 80s, the nominal increasing of income was in great part translated in an 
increase of the internal revenue. 
The tax scheme is fixed with reference to the nominal income, which is not adjusted for inflation, 
for this reason supposing three parties in the negotiation:
4 Cfr.: V. Selan  - Elementi di scienza delle Finanze – G. D'anna 1986. p. 65-71
• The employee 
• The employer 
• The government
Supposing a gross annual income perceived by an employee equal to 55,000 €, an increase of the 
nominal income or a bonus equal to 2,000 € represents an increasing of cost for the employer. Now 
the question is: 
how is shared the amount or the bonus, between the employee, and the government?
In a flat tax system the last 2,000 € are taxed with the same tax percentage, but in a progressive 
system the 2,000 € are taxed with the marginal tax rate which is higher, following the progressive 
system.  So  paradoxically  an  increase  of  income  taxed  with  a  higher  percentage  becomes 
discouraging.   
In other words, in the first case the advantage is neutral, whereas in the second the advantage is for 
the government, which obtains more, compared to the first case.
This is another motivation which attests to how progressive tax system is not fairer than a flat tax 
system. The reductions in marginal tax rates stimulate economic effort, expanding the size of the 
taxable economic pie. An Increased economic activity represents a benefits for the entire society.
4. Proposal and Conclusion
The Proposal of adoption of a flat taxation system from the policy maker and the great part of 
opinion  maker  is  commonly  accompanied  by  negative  comments  and mystifications  which  are 
usually the results of a prejudice and scarce knowledge.
Commonly the opinion makers stress the presumed lack of equity embedded in the flat tax system.
However, as presented in many surveys and I hope in the present paper, this argumentation is weak; 
with  the  flat  tax  system the  fiscal  pressure  is  more  manageable  and  the  advantages  are  more 
determinable by the taxpayers.  
Some  of  the  main  advantages  were  explained  in  the  previous  paragraphs,  although  the 
argumentations in favor of the flat tax rate are more articulated and need more space, my objective 
is present an coherent and applicable model with incentives for the implementation of a flat tax rate.
The model includes two important characteristics which can act as incentives.
Let's suppose a ordinary flat tax rate of 26% for the Gross annual income. 
Starting from the assumption that the monitoring regarding the declaration is easy and rapid, for 
every taxpayer who doesn't receive sanctions after five years it receive a discount in the flat rate 
from 26% to 24%, the discount of 2% represents a fidelity premium,  (financed by reducing the 
cost of monitoring) which is a premium for the correct behavior of the taxpayer. This incentive 
reduced the monitoring and the relative costs increased the probability that the government receive 
the amount due, and moreover makes tax avoidance and tax evasion, less advantageous rewards 
fair behavior. 
On the contrary whoever receives two sanctions for fiscal irregularities (tax evasion) in 5 years, is 
obliged to an increase of the flat tax rate from 26% to 30%.
In the long term this situation is stable; in fact the expectation of discount embedded in the model, 
improves the economic environment, and strengthens virtuous behaviors.
Another crucial point of the model is obtained from the battle against tax evasion. Tax evasion is a 
complex problem which regards not only the taxpayers but the entire economy. For this reason the 
model predicts which advantages coming from the battle against tax evasion, are shared from all. 
The practical norm is that every recovery of extra-revenue is translated in a discount in the general 
flat rate, with benefits for the entire community. The scope respecting the equity is to obtain the 
same  internal revenue with more equity distribution of the tax charges, recognizing that in the 
presence of tax evasion the honest tax payers are creditors (because they pay more than the right 
amount) to the government whereas the tax evader is a debtor to the government.    
The objective is to create a conflict of interests between the taxpayer and the tax evader, and not 
from the taxpayer and the government. The principle is respect for the honest taxpayer, and the 
delivery of the extra amount paid due to the tax evader.
Summarizing the model becomes:
Ytot Total Gross Domestic Product 
Yo GDP Ratio referred to the ordinary flat tax rate.  
Ytp GDP Ratio referred to the virtuous tax payers.
Yte GDP Ratio referred to the tax evaders. 
Ftr Ordinary flat tax rate 26%.  
Tg Gross Internal Revenue.
Tnet Net Internal Revenue.
Cm Cost of monitoring (which include part of the costs needs for detect the tax evader) 
  
Tnet = (Tg – Cm) = 26%Yo + (24%Ytp+30%Yte)
In this model government starts the fiscal policy fixing the Tnet (net internal revenue) for a long 
enough horizon, for example the entire legislature, and after using the variables included in the 
formula following an order established to obtain the results expected. 
The reduction of Costs monitoring implies an increase in the Net Internal Revenue,  without an 
increase in the fiscal pressure. Therefore the model in the long term produces an increasing of the 
Tnet which represents an improvement in the efficiency of the fiscal agency which is translated in a 
reduction of taxation rate.  
An increase of the GDP, implies and increase of the Gross internal Revenue, and correspondingly 
of  the  Net  internal  revenue,  without regressive  or  disincentive  effects  as  in  the  progressive 
taxation system. Moreover another aspect must be considered, this system with the flat tax produce 
and internal revenue more stable which becomes an auto stabilizer. In fact in many OECD countries 
the problem is the wide variability of the Internal revenue, which instead of becoming a stabilizer 
becomes a source of instability5.
The  taxation  is  considered  in  many discussions,  particularly  by the  policy makers  not  only an 
instrument for collect resources for the functioning of public services, but even an instrument for 
promote equity and social justice.
However,  this  argumentation  is  weak  because  the  “natural  justice”  imply  a  system  of  values 
stratified in the national culture, and the ratio of law or L'esprit des lois, could include the system of 
5 Cfr.: F. Schneider - The Size of the Shadow Economies of 145 Countries all over the World: First Results over the 
Period 1999 to 2003 - IZA DP n. 1431, December 2004.  pp. 6-54. 
values. In others terms the market may be the judge of the economic situation, which promote or 
reject the economics activity. For this reason is desirable that the interference of the political power 
be minimal, and finalized only to improve the situations which are not really resolvable within the 
market.  
In  Conclusion,  the  flat  tax  rate,  represents  a  fair  system of  taxation  which  implies  a  different 
relation from citizen and government or as pointed out in my title a Reconsideration of the social  
contract between State and Citizens. 
It is useful to remember that the relation between citizen and state must be imbued with confidence 
and respect of the norms, but to this end the norm must respect the individuals, and the diversity, 
the oppressive norms produce mistrust and the violation of the norm itself. Paraphrasing Hayek, the 
knowledge  in  advance of  an act  of  the state  is  a  general  rule  of  law and  doesn't  represent  a 
coercion.  
December 2010
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